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Abstract: Although scholars increasingly recognize that people often possess multiple and even 
conflicting attitudes about a given topic, our understanding of the nature, causes, and 
consequences of such attitudinal ambivalence is limited by a lack of consensus as to how the 
concept should be operationalized. In this paper, we examine three separate measures (one 
subjective, two operative) of ambivalence regarding "the federal government in Washington" 
that were asked in the 2006 ANES Pilot Study. Our findings indicate that while the operative 
measures are less susceptible to question-order and response-order effects, none of the three 
indicators fares particularly well in various other tests of construct validity. 
 
Paper presented for delivery at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL, August 30-September 2, 2007. © American Political Science 
Association. 
 Conflict is the root of politics. Often, when we think about political conflict, what comes 
to mind are the issues that divide northerners from southerners, haves from have-nots, moralists 
from secularists, minorities from majorities, and women from men. After all, as James Madison 
reminded us in Federalist 10, differences in interests, abilities, and lifestyles that give rise to 
conflicts between people are "sown in the nature of man." Conflict, however, also exists within 
individuals' own thought processes. Poor people are more likely than rich people to see and to 
value the societal advantages that accrue from social welfare policies, yet many among the ranks 
of rich and poor alike might value both economic opportunity and a tightly woven social safety 
net. Environmentalists are more likely than local developers to prefer conservation measures to 
unbridled economic growth, but each side (and especially those on neither side) might see a mix 
of benefits and drawbacks to the regulation of property by government. Even on the culturally 
divisive issue of abortion, many Americans feel torn between two "rights" – that of the woman 
trying to decide whether to abort, and that of the fetus whose fate rests with her decision. 
 As obvious as it may be that such conflicted feelings do exist, for many years researchers 
in both social psychology and political science (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Zaller and Feldman 
1992) generally conceptualized attitudes as being unidimensional. Thurstone's (1928; Thurstone 
and Chave 1929) seminal work on attitude measurement, for example, characterized attitudes as 
bipolar, ranging from positive (or favorable) to negative (or unfavorable), with a neutral point in 
between. In his review of attitude research, Allport (1935) even suggested that the bipolarity of 
attitudes (favorable vs. unfavorable) were their most distinct feature. This seemed to make 
perfect sense because on most issues people undoubtedly do think in bipolar terms. They either 
like something or they don't, support a policy/party/candidate or oppose it. Similarly, in political 
commentary, political leaders are described as being either "liberal" or "conservative" (or perhaps 
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"middle-of-the-road") – and, depending on their own predispositions, voters are thought to react 
accordingly, i.e., positively or negatively, but probably not both at the same time. Research over 
the years, though, has made it clear that the unidimensional model does not capture the entire 
story.1 
 Psychologists and political scientists have increasingly come to embrace the idea that 
people do not always have a single "true" attitude about a particular topic, but rather a store of 
multiple and sometimes contradictory attitudes that they might draw upon when answering 
questions in an opinion survey, deciding which candidate to vote for in an election, or otherwise 
choosing from among alternative scenarios or courses of action (Zaller and Feldman 1992; also 
see Zaller 1992). When someone's evaluations, beliefs, or emotions concerning an attitude object 
are in conflict with one another, we might describe that person as being ambivalent (Alvarez and 
Brehm 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005). Defining ambivalence 
is one thing,2 however, while measuring it is quite another. As the concept received greater 
attention in recent years, scholars began to develop and test a variety of different approaches. 
Whereas some of these are indirect and inferential (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 
1995, 2002), there have been numerous attempts to measure individual-level ambivalence 
directly using both objective (Kaplan 1972; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995) and subjective 
(Priester and Petty 1996; Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, and D'Andrade 1989; Holbrook and 
Krosnick 2005) indicators. The present study focuses on individuals, comparing the construct 
validity of objective (or operative) and subjective (or meta-attitudinal) measures of ambivalence 
toward government that were included in the 2006 ANES Pilot Study.3 
Measuring Ambivalence toward Government 
 One of the most dramatic trends in American public opinion over the past half century 
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involves the loss of public confidence in government (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Pew 
Center for the People and the Press 2006; Keele 2007). Although there is no consensus regarding 
the precise origins and meaning of this trend, it seems clear that at least part of the explanation is 
performance-based, i.e., with many people expressing dissatisfaction because they don't believe 
that governmental leaders and institutions have dealt effectively with important problems facing 
the nation (Citrin and Luks 2001; Stimson 2004; Hetherington 2005). Other factors undoubtedly 
matter as well (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Keele 2007), but our interest here lies with the 
possibility that the relationship between rulers and ruled may not be quite as precarious as it 
appears to be at first glance. Some scholars maintain that a lack of confidence in government 
should be viewed as the norm in American politics and, consequently, that the long-term decline 
is less in need of explanation than are the higher trust levels observed in the early 1960s and the 
periodic spikes that occur during periods of war or national crisis (Alford 2001). Others have 
suggested that the most frequently employed indicators of concepts such as political trust are 
measuring traditional American skepticism about government rather than active mistrust, and that 
only the latter – which probably has not changed much in recent years – is likely to have serious 
consequences for governability or system stability (Cook and Gronke 2005; Craig, Gainous, and 
Martinez 2006). 
 Alternatively, perhaps it is ambivalence more than skepticism that characterizes citizens' 
attitudes about government today. Students of public opinion during the Truman-Eisenhower era 
often described the public as being of two minds in their attitudes about government. Hyman and 
Sheatsley (1954; also see Mitchell 1959), for example, reported that ambivalence was evident in 
the fact that many people criticized almost any government agency they were asked about while 
simultaneously expressing great pride in officeholders and institutions, and opposed government 
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interference with business while nonetheless expecting elected leaders to solve pressing social 
problems. 
 More recently, McGraw and Bartels (2005) examined ANES data to determine whether 
citizens exhibited inconsistency (or conflict) in their evaluations of Congress, President Clinton, 
and the Supreme Court with regard to four characteristics: doesn't get much accomplished, too 
involved in partisan politics, doesn't care what ordinary people think, and corrupt. They found 
that cognitive ambivalence toward each of the three branches of the national government was 
fairly common during the late 1990s, but that ambivalence in one instance did not necessarily 
imply ambivalence across the board (correlations between the different sets of indicators ranged 
from moderate to nonexistent). In a survey of registered voters in Florida, Craig, Gainous, and 
Martinez (2006) found that most respondents experienced some degree of affective ambivalence 
toward the three levels of government in the United States (national, state, local); their analysis 
also indicated that those who were ambivalent toward one level tended to be ambivalent toward 
others as well (though the relationships were of fairly modest magnitude), and that ambivalence 
and political trust were unrelated, i.e., the former was as common among individuals with a 
positive view of government as it was among those whose outlook was more critical. 
 Our understanding of the nature, causes, and consequences of attitudinal ambivalence is 
limited, however, by a difference of opinion among scholars as to how the concept should be 
operationalized. In particular, prior research suggests that attributes of attitudes (of which 
ambivalence is one, along with importance, strength, commitment, and others) can be measured 
in surveys either subjectively, by asking respondents to "self-diagnose" their own attitude state, or 
operatively, by asking questions designed to reveal symptoms of the attitude state (Bassili 1996).4 
A subjective approach is attractive largely because of its simplicity. Asking respondents how 
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certain they are, or how conflicted they feel, about an attitude they have just expressed is easy to 
do; such questions are usually quick to administer, they yield a direct and pre-coded measure of 
the attitude attribute, and they help to maintain the "flow" of conversation between interviewer 
and respondent. Especially from the perspective of survey design, there is much to recommend 
the use of subjective measures of ambivalence. 
 Subjective measures may fail, however, if interviewers are asking respondents to tell us 
more than they can actually know. Although well-designed surveys should enable people to more 
or less accurately report on their thoughts and feelings, respondents often miss the mark when 
they try to describe the psychological attributes of those thoughts and feelings or the mental 
processes that led to them (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). In the case of ambivalence, self-reports are 
accurate only if people recognize attitude conflict, store the perception or experience of conflict 
in long-term memory, and are able to retrieve that perception when forming a response to the 
survey question about conflict. Unfortunately, even if attitude attributes are not well-represented 
in memory, subjective measures may still generate reports of "non-attributes" from individuals 
who search for clues (heuristics) from the survey context that can help them provide answers to 
questions and thereby keep the "conversation" going (Bassili 1996: 638-639). Consequently, 
while subjective measures of ambivalence are relatively easy to administer, there is reason to 
doubt that they are actually measuring what they intend to measure. 
 In contrast, operative measures of ambivalence are based on questions that reveal trace 
evidence of attitude conflict. Following a procedure outlined by Thompson, Zanna and Griffin 
(1995), our measurement strategy in a series of prior studies has been to ask respondents for their 
separate positive and negative feelings about an issue (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Craig, 
Martinez, Kane, and Gainous 2005; Gainous and Martinez 2005) and to regard those who offered 
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a mix of both as ambivalent. While this approach is consistent with the standard conception of 
ambivalence, asking people to provide separate favorable and unfavorable evaluations about 
multiple attitude objects in a single survey can be cumbersome, tedious, and expensive. Scholars 
also have utilized other operative measures, of varying degrees of complexity; some of these are 
based, for example, on open-ended likes/dislikes of parties and candidates (Lavine 2001; 
Basinger and Lavine 2005), social group feeling thermometers (Lavine and Steenbergen 2005), 
and responses to closed-ended questions that tap respondents' political values (Rudolph 2005), 
policy positions (Cantril and Cantril 1999), emotional states (Citrin and Luks 2005), and the traits 
they ascribe to political leaders and institutions (McGraw and Bartels 2005). 
 Our objective in this paper is to assess the validity of three measures of ambivalence, two 
operative and one subjective. We do so by determining, first, the extent to which the different 
measures are more or less resistant to context (question order and wording) effects within the 
survey; and, second, whether they moderate either the stability of attitudes over time (Craig, 
Martinez, and Kane 2005; Armitage and Connor 2000; Bassili 1996) or the impact of an attitude 
on other attitudes and behavior (Armitage and Connor 2000; Craig, Martinez, Kane, and Gainous 
2005). In addition, we examine the relationship between the three measures of ambivalence and 
three other theoretically relevant variables: political interest, party identification, and support for 
divided government. 
Data and Questions 
 As noted above, the 2006 ANES Pilot Study5 included one "self-diagnosis" and two sets 
of questions that were used construct operative measures of ambivalence regarding the federal 
government. The subjective (or meta-ambivalence; see Holbrook and Krosnick 2005) item is 
worded as follows: 
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"How conflicting are your thoughts and feelings about the federal government in 
Washington?" (V06P639) 
Half of the sample was randomly assigned to have response options for this question and others 
in the Pilot Study read to them in forward order ("extremely conflicting, very conflicting, 
moderately conflicting, slightly conflicting, or not conflicting at all"), while the other half heard 
the same list presented in reverse order (beginning with "not conflicting at all"). In Table 1, we 
see that respondents indicated higher levels of ambivalence when the most conflicting response 
options were presented first. 
Table 1 about here 
 The set of questions that forms the basis for our own operative measure of ambivalence is 
based on experimental work in social psychology, as adapted for use in large-N surveys (Craig, 
Kane, and Martinez 2002). The technique is a version of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, 
and Tannenbaum 1957), modified by Kaplan (1972) in an effort to show that people's overall 
attitudes are made up of both positive and negative elements. In order to separate the two, Kaplan 
divided semantic differential scales at the neutral point and asked respondents to indicate both 
how positively and how negatively they viewed an attitude object. 
 Following this model, half of the ANES Pilot Study sample was asked the following 
sequence of questions: 
"You might have favorable thoughts or feelings about the federal government in 
Washington. Or you might have unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the federal 
government in Washington. Or you might have some of each. I would like to ask 
you first about any favorable thoughts and feelings you might have about the 
 
 
 
8
federal government in Washington. Then in a moment, I'll ask you some separate 
questions about any unfavorable thoughts and feelings you might have." 
• "First, do you have ANY favorable thoughts or feelings about the federal 
government in Washington, or do you NOT have any?" (V06P635) 
• (If yes) "How favorable are your favorable thoughts and feelings about the 
federal government in Washington?" (V06P636) 
• "Do you have ANY unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the federal 
government in Washington, or do you NOT have any?" (V06P637) 
• (If yes) "How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts and feelings 
about the federal government in Washington?" (V06P638) 
Respondents who were selected for the forward response options in the meta-ambivalence 
question also were presented with forward response options to both V06P636 ("extremely 
favorable, very favorable, moderately favorable, or slightly favorable") and V06P638 ("extremely 
unfavorable, very unfavorable, moderately unfavorable, or slightly unfavorable"). Everyone else 
was given the reverse options to those questions ("slightly favorable" presented first in V06P636, 
"slightly unfavorable" in V06P638). According to the results in Table 2, there were no significant 
order effects evident on any of these questions. 
Table 2 about here 
 Based on people's answers to the four operative measures, we calculated an ambivalence 
score using an algorithm developed by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995): 
Operative Ambivalence  = [(P + N)/2] - |P - N| 
where P is the positive (favorable) reaction score and N is the negative (unfavorable) reaction 
score. Scores for each item range from –2.0 ("extremely" positive and no negative thoughts or 
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feelings, or "extremely" negative and no positive) to +4.0 ("extremely" positive and negative 
thoughts or feelings for the same statement; see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002: 291-92). The 
mean operative ambivalence score for those presented with the forward response options 
("extremely favorable" and "extremely unfavorable") first was .165, and the mean for the reverse-
option group was -.041; this difference is statistically trivial (t = 1.430, p = .154). 
 A second operative measure of ambivalence about the federal government was derived 
from a pair of open-ended questions posed to the half-sample of respondents who were not asked 
for their separate favorable/unfavorable thoughts and feelings. The questions were as follows: 
"Is there anything in particular that you like about the federal government in 
Washington? What is that?" (V06P640) 
"Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the federal government in 
Washington? What is that?" (V06P642) 
Respondents were invited to offer as many likes and dislikes as they wanted, though most were 
fairly terse in their answers to these questions. Roughly six in ten (62.5%) said that there was 
nothing they liked about the government in Washington, while the median respondent articulated 
a single dislike. A few were more loquacious: one person offered six likes, and eight respondents 
reported six or more dislikes (one actually reported ten). Using the same algorithm as employed 
with the favorable/unfavorable evaluations described above, we calculated a second operative 
ambivalence score based on the number of likes and dislikes (V06P641 and V06P643, 
respectively) provided by each respondent, recoding the maximum number of likes or dislikes to 
five in order to reduce the impact of outlying responses (cf. Basinger and Lavine 2005; Lavine 
and Steenbergen 2005). Figure 1 shows that the distributions of both operative ambivalence 
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measures are centered at zero, though the measure based on likes/dislikes is somewhat more 
peaked than the one based on favorable/unfavorable thoughts and feelings. 
Figure 1 about here 
 In sum, all 675 Pilot Study respondents were asked the meta-ambivalence question, half 
were asked the operative favorable/unfavorable questions, and the other half were asked the 
operative likes/dislikes questions. Each half-sample was further divided into groups that were 
asked either the meta-ambivalence question prior to the operative questions, or the operative 
questions prior to the meta-ambivalence question. Finally, those groups were split again, with 
some people receiving the forward response options on the meta-ambivalence and operative 
favorable/unfavorable questions, and others receiving the reverse options as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
Analysis of Ambivalence Measures 
Question-Order and Response-Order Effects 
 Results show that scores on the subjective (meta-ambivalence) measure were susceptible 
to both question-order and response-order effects. Respondents who answered meta-ambivalence 
and the operative favorable/unfavorable questions reported higher levels of internal conflict when 
the former was asked first (respective means of 2.962 and 2.522, t = 3.624, p < .001); similarly, 
those who answered meta-ambivalence in combination with the likes/dislikes reported higher 
conflict when presented with the subjective measure first (respective means of 3.086 and 2.710, t 
= 3.344, p = .001). It thus appears that respondents' subjective assessments of internal conflict are 
somehow dampened when they are initially asked to express their favorable and unfavorable 
thoughts, or their likes and dislikes, regarding the federal government. That is, when confronted 
with the operative questions first, some people conclude that they are not as conflicted as they 
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might otherwise have believed to be the case (see Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1984). In 
contrast, the effects of question order on respondents' operative ambivalence scores are not 
statistically significant; those who were asked the meta-ambivalence questions first had slightly 
higher mean scores on the operative measures (.162 to -.035 on the favorable/unfavorable 
measure, -.028 to -.096 on the likes/dislikes measure), but those differences could be attributable 
to sampling (t = 1.367, p = .173 on the former, t = 0.717, p = .474 on the latter). 
 There also is a significant interaction effect of response order and question order on 
individuals' meta-ambivalence scores. As noted earlier (see Table 1), respondents who heard the 
"extremely conflicting, very conflicting . . ." response options first reported, on average, a higher 
level of internal conflict than those who were presented with the reverse sequence (beginning 
with "not conflicting at all"; F = 11.17, df = 1, p < 0.001). As shown in Table 4, this effect is 
especially pronounced among those who answered the meta-ambivalence question following the 
operative favorable/unfavorable items (F on the interaction term = 2.920, df = 3, p = 0.033). In 
contrast, the analysis of variance results portrayed in the middle and rightmost columns of the 
table indicates that neither operative measure of ambivalence was significantly affected by 
question order (F = 1.19, df = 1, p = .276 for favorable/unfavorable; F = 0.58, df = 1, p = .445 for 
likes/dislikes), response order in the meta-ambivalence question (F = 1.29, df = 1, p = .257 for 
favorable/unfavorable; F = 0.40, df = 1, p = .547 for likes/dislikes), or their interaction (F = 1.52, 
df = 1, p = .218 for favorable/unfavorable; F = 0.56, df = 1, p = 0.417 for likes/dislikes). 
Table 4 about here 
 In sum, the meta-ambivalence item appears to be more malleable and context-dependent 
than either of the operative measures. This suggests that the latter may be more valid indicators 
of ambivalence. 
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Ambivalence and Attitude Stability 
 An examination of their relationships with attitude stability (Craig, Martinez, and Kane 
2005; Armitage and Connor 2000; Bassili 1996) permits us to assess the construct validity of the 
various subjective and operative ambivalence measures. Specifically, we expect that people who 
are most ambivalent will exhibit less stable attitudes about the federal government over time. The 
design of the 2006 ANES Pilot Study provides a test of that proposition. All respondents in the 
Pilot Study had also participated in the traditional 2004 ANES survey, and are thus part of a two-
year panel. As in the past, the 2004 ANES included the question, 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington 
to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time? 
(V045197) 
as part of a four-item battery designed to measure trust in government. 
 In 2006, the Pilot Study posed three versions this question. One group of 219 respondents 
was given the standard wording (V06P654), thereby allowing us to observe directly the stability 
of trust over a two-year period. Another group (N = 238) was asked how much of the time 
("always, most of the time, about half the time, once in awhile, or never") they felt the 
government in Washington could be trusted to "make decisions in a fair way" (V06P656) and "do 
what is best for the country." (V06P658) A third group (N = 218) was asked what percentage of 
the time they felt the government in Washington could be trusted to "make decisions in a fair 
way" (V06P660) and "do what is best for the country." (V06P662)6 The correlation between "fair 
decisions" and "do what is best" is high in the second (taub = .513, p < .001) and third groups 
(taub = .694, p < .001), so in each instance these items were combined into an index. Once again, 
we anticipate that less ambivalent respondents will exhibit greater stability from 2004 to 2006 on 
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the standard trust question, and higher over-time correlations between standard trust in 2004 and 
the experimental trust questions in 2006. 
 Table 5 shows that this expectation is modestly supported with the meta-ambivalence 
measure: Respondents who reported less internal conflict in their thoughts and feelings about the 
federal government were indeed more stable in their answers to the standard trust question than 
were those who indicated greater conflict. The over-time taub correlation for that item was .352 
among individuals with low subjective ambivalence ("not at all" or "slightly" conflicting), 
compared with a trivial .142 for the highly ambivalent ("very" or "extremely" conflicting). With 
regard to the relationship between old and new measures of trust, the evidence is mixed: As we 
expected, the correlation between 2004 trust and the "how often best and fair" index in 2006 is 
highest (taub = .466) among respondents who felt the least conflicted. In contrast, the correlation 
between 2004 trust and the "percentage best and fair" index in 2006 is strongest (taub = .508) for 
the high-ambivalence group. 
Table 5 about here 
 Results for the operative favorable/unfavorable measure are somewhat inconsistent as 
well. On the one hand, people who were more ambivalent (scores of zero and above) based on 
separate favorable/unfavorable evaluations actually have slightly higher over-time correlations 
(taub = .384) on the trust-Washington item than did those who exhibited less ambivalence (.320). 
More in line with our hypothesis, however, correlations between 2004 trust and the two new 
2006 indices are substantially higher (.342 for "how often best and fair", .616 for "percentage 
best and fair") among those with low scores on operative ambivalence (compared with .280 and 
.196, respectively, for everyone else).  
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 The operative likes/dislikes measure did not fare as well on this test, with correlations 
between the 2004 trust-Washington item and all three 2006 trust questions being slightly higher 
among those with greater ambivalence (scores of zero and above). Overall, then, evidence of a 
moderating effect on attitude stability is mixed for both meta-ambivalence and the favorable/ 
unfavorable measure, and is non-existent for likes/dislikes. 
Ambivalence, Trust, and Vote Choice 
 Our next test of construct validity is based on the premise that ambivalence moderates not 
only over-time stability, but also the relationship between attitudes and actual or intended 
behavior (Sparks, Harris, and Lockwood 2004). If we consider ambivalence about the federal 
government to be an attribute of the attitude of political trust, we would expect that high levels of 
ambivalence would moderate any relationships between trust and behavior. One intended 
behavior that is theoretically related to trust is vote choice, with greater cynicism increasing the 
likelihood of support for out-party candidates in two-candidate races and third-party candidates in 
three-way races (Hetherington 1999). Respondents in the 2006 Pilot Study were asked to imagine 
this interesting scenario: 
"Suppose that an election were being held today that would determine who the 
President of the United States is for the next four years. And imagine that the only 
candidates allowed to run in that election were Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. 
And imagine that you voted in that election. Who would you vote for: Bill Clinton 
or George W. Bush?"7 (V06P774) 
 If trust at least partially reflects some assessment of the incumbent administration, as 
Hetherington (1999) suggests, we might expect that the trusting will be more likely to support 
Bush over his predecessor in this hypothetical horserace. That expectation is borne out in our 
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estimate of a logit model reported in Table 6 Model 1. Political trust (as measured with the "trust 
Washington to do what is right" item asked of 219 respondents in the 2006 Pilot Study) has a 
significant positive effect on the likelihood of supporting Bush, controlling for 2004 partisanship 
and 2006 response-order effects (see note 7). The overall impact of trust in this model is quite 
stunning; for example, the average probability of a Bush "vote" by a pure independent (who was 
offered the Bush response first) increases from 21.9% for someone who trusts the government in 
Washington "only some of the time" to 40.0% for someone who trusts Washington "most of the 
time."  
Table 6 about here 
 In Table 6 Model 2, we add the subjective ambivalence term and its interaction with trust.  
If ambivalence moderates the effect of trust on voter choice, we would expect to see a significant 
negative coefficient for the interaction term, which would indicate that the effect of trust on voter 
choice diminishes as ambivalence increases. However, our estimates here provide no evidence of 
a moderating effect for the meta-ambivalence measure. In this specification, the main effect of 
trust switches signs and loses significance, and neither the main effect of meta-ambivalence nor 
the interaction term have significant effects on the hypothetical vote choice (p > .10 for both). 
 The moderation prediction also does not pan out in Model 3, which includes the 
favorable/unfavorable operative ambivalence measure and its interaction with trust. Despite the 
loss of cases (mainly due to only half the sample being asked this set of operative ambivalence 
questions), the main effect of trust remains positive and significant (p < .08) controlling for both 
operative ambivalence and the interaction term. The main effect of operative ambivalence is 
negative (anti-Bush), but not significant. More importantly, the interaction term is positive 
(contrary to our expectations) and statistically not discernible from zero. In sum, we see no 
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evidence that the favorable/unfavorable operative ambivalence moderates the effect of 
ambivalence on vote choice. 
 Model 4 includes the likes/dislikes measure as well as the interaction of that variable with 
political trust. In this estimation, the main effect of operative ambivalence is negative (anti-Bush) 
and significant, while the main effect of trust switches signs and loses significance (the negative 
coefficient indicating that among people with a zero score on operative ambivalence, trust is 
associated with a somewhat lower likelihood of supporting the incumbent). The interaction effect 
between ambivalence and trust is positive and significant, which does suggest that the direction 
of the relationship between trust and vote choice is conditioned by ambivalence. However, the 
negative (and non-significant) main effect of trust was unexpected and inexplicable given our 
current understanding of the theoretical relationship between trust and voter choice. Overall, we 
do not find strong evidence that ambivalence moderates the pro-incumbent effects of trust on 
voter choice, with either meta-ambivalence or the operative ambivalence measures. 
Ambivalence and Political Interest 
 Prior research on how ambivalence shapes political information processing suggests an 
examination of the relationship between ambivalence and political interest. Our definition of 
ambivalence might lead us to expect that the relationship would be a positive one; after all, in 
order to simultaneously hold conflicting evaluations of the same attitude object, one must have at 
least two thoughts (one positive and one negative) about the object. An increasing number of 
thoughts in a domain increases the probability that some of those thoughts will have opposite 
valences, thereby leading to greater ambivalence. If our logic here is correct, it seems reasonable 
to predict that there will be a positive correlation between interest and ambivalence. 
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 It is possible, however, that ambivalence operates as an independent rather than a 
dependent variable in this relationship. Returning to the distinction between potential 
ambivalence (when conflicting attitudes coexist) and felt ambivalence (when that conflict is 
accessible in memory and produces cognitive discomfort; see note 3), scholars disagree about the 
likely consequences of the latter. Some argue, for example, that the dissonance associated with 
felt ambivalence should motivate information seeking and systematic information processing in 
an attempt to resolve the ambivalence (Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2000; McGraw and Bartels 
2005). But others maintain that meta-ambivalence is negatively associated with domain-specific 
interest due to people's efforts to avoid the psychological discomfort associated with ambivalence 
(Holbrook and Krosnick 2005). 
In Table 7, we report the correlations between ambivalence and various measures of 
political interest included in both the Pilot Study and the 2004 pre-post election study. In general, 
meta-ambivalence is positively but weakly correlated with most measures of political interest (the 
exception being "how often R pays attention" in 2006). The correlations between political interest 
and operative ambivalence based on likes/dislikes are also mostly positive though even weaker 
than those for meta-ambivalence, while operative ambivalence based on favorable/unfavorable 
evaluations is statistically unrelated to political interest. 
Table 7 about here 
Ambivalence and Partisanship 
 Political campaigns often serve to highlight the different conceptions that our two major 
parties have about the role that government should play in regulating citizens' economic, social, 
and moral behavior. Although one might normally expect that strong partisans on both sides 
would experience less ambivalence regarding the federal government, the limited evidence we 
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have on that topic is inconsistent. McGraw and Bartels (2005), for example, found that partisan 
strength was positively associated with ambivalence about Congress, but not with ambivalence 
about President Clinton or the Supreme Court. Citrin and Luks (2005), on the other hand, 
reported that independents were somewhat less emotionally ambivalent about America than 
either Republicans or Democrats, and that ideological moderates were less ambivalent than 
liberals or conservatives. 
 Results in Table 8 show that ambivalence about the federal government (using either 
meta-ambivalence or the operative measures) is essentially unrelated to strength of partisanship 
or ideological extremity in 2004-06. The few statistically significant relationships that we 
observe suggest a mild positive relationship between ambivalence and partisan strength, but are 
very weak in magnitude (taub < .13). Moreover, ambivalence is not associated with an increased 
likelihood of preference for divided over unified government (as measured in 2004). 
Table 8 about here 
Summary and Discussion 
 In this paper, we examined the validity of one subjective and two operative measures of 
ambivalence about the federal government. Our first test considered whether these indicators 
were susceptible to context effects stemming from variations in question order and response-
option order in the 2006 ANES Pilot Study survey. Although we found no significant effects for 
the operative measures, meta-ambivalence proved to be quite sensitive to both types of 
variations. That is, respondents reported experiencing less internal conflict (a) when low-conflict 
response options preceded high-conflict options; and (b) after first being asked either to verbalize 
their likes and dislikes about the federal government, or to provide separate favorable and 
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unfavorable evaluations. The relative malleability of the meta-ambivalence measure would seem 
to raise serious doubts about its validity. 
 Further tests of construct validity were less conclusive. Prior research has established that 
ambivalence fosters attitude instability, and that it sometimes moderates the relationship between 
attitudes and other attitudes or behavior (actual or intended). Accordingly, we anticipated that 
people with lower levels of ambivalence would exhibit greater two-year stability on a standard 
ANES political trust item, as well as higher correlations between that item in 2004 and new 
measures of trust asked in the Pilot Study two years later. However, while meta-ambivalence was 
predictably related to the over-time (in)stability of traditional trust, correlations between old and 
new measures were, in one instance, actually highest among the most subjectively ambivalent. 
The measures of operative ambivalence fared little better: Correlations between old and new trust 
questions were indeed lower among the most ambivalent respondents (based on favorable/ 
unfavorable evaluations), but those same individuals exhibited slightly higher two-year stability 
for "trust Washington to do what is right." Respondents who scored relatively high on likes/ 
dislikes operative ambivalence also showed slightly higher over-time stability on measures of 
trust. Neither meta-ambivalence nor the operative measures reliably moderated the relationship 
between trust and support for President Bush in a hypothetical matchup with former President 
Clinton. Taken together, the results of our various construct validity tests are not very 
encouraging for researchers eager to include either subjective or operative measures of 
ambivalence in omnibus surveys;8 in addition, they raise serious concerns about the relatively 
high susceptibility of the meta-ambivalence measure to survey context. 
 Nevertheless, we wish to offer a caveat based on our finding that the subjective measure 
of ambivalence was positively related to political interest, while the operative measure was not. 
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That result9 is consistent with research suggesting that the two approaches are not measuring the 
same thing, but instead tap different concepts. Felt ambivalence is, by definition, subjective, 
which may explain why no one to our knowledge has developed an operative measure of it for 
use in either experimental or survey contexts. Similarly, potential ambivalence is conceptually 
non-subjective, and thus always measured operatively. To the degree that researchers are 
interested in the causes or effects of felt ambivalence, they have no choice but to rely on some 
subjective measure, though our concerns about the validity of this particular subjective measure 
(as applied to this attitude object) suggest some degree of caution. 
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Notes 
 1. Much of that research is reviewed in Craig and Martinez (2005a, 2005b). 
 2. We agree with those who maintain that conflict between idea elements (as opposed, for 
example, to the more general "opposing considerations" described by Zaller and Feldman) is a 
necessary and defining characteristic of ambivalence (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Craig, Kane, and 
Martinez 2002). 
 3. Some scholars believe that operative and subjective measures may tap fundamentally 
different concepts. Newby-Clark, MacGregor, and Zanna (2002, 2005), for example, distinguish 
between "potential" ambivalence, referring to the existence of concurrent and conflicting 
attitudes, and "felt" ambivalence, defined as the simultaneous accessibility of those conflicting 
attitudes in working memory. In other words, the presence of attitude conflict, which might be 
best measured operatively, is necessary but not always sufficient to produce felt ambivalence, 
which might be best measured subjectively (Holbrook and Krosnick 2005). 
 4. The relationship between subjective and operative measures of ambivalence does not 
appear to be as strong as one might expect. For example, when Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 
(1995; also see Mulligan 2007) compared subjects' operative scores with their personal 
assessments regarding feelings of conflict (i.e., "I find myself feeling 'torn' between two sides of 
the issue of euthanasia"), they found only moderate correlations (not exceeding .40) between the 
two. Based on similar results, Priester and Petty (2001: 29) concluded that operative measures 
"account for only a moderate amount of the variance associated with the reported psychological 
experience of ambivalence." 
 5. The Pilot Study sample of 675 respondents was drawn from the 1211 individuals who 
participated in the 2004 American National Election Study post-election survey. Interviews were 
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conducted by telephone from November 13, 2006 through January 7, 2007. All analyses reported 
here, except for the logit results in Table 6, were weighted using the 2006 Pilot Study weight 
variable. The Pilot Study was supported by the National Science Foundation under grants SES-
0535332 and SES-0535334, Stanford University, and the University of Michigan; more infor-
mation is available at http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2006pilot/2006pilot.htm. Our 
opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
NES staff or funding organizations. 
 6. Pilot study respondents were also asked about their trust in state governments with 
versions of the standard and experimental trust questions. Because the focus of the ambivalence 
measures was on the government in Washington, we did not examine the items measuring trust in 
the states. 
 7. Half of the respondents were asked the hypothetical horserace question with Bush's 
name first. 
 8. We hasten to add that "the federal government in Washington" (as opposed to 
something less amorphous such as "President Bush" or "it should be possible for a pregnant 
woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the 
pregnancy") may not be the attitude object most conducive to producing the hypothesized results. 
 9. Along the same lines, our analysis shows that political trust (as measured with either 
the traditional ANES item or the two new measures introduced in 2006) is positively correlated 
with meta-ambivalence, but negatively correlated with operative ambivalence. 
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Figure 1: Distributions of Two Measures of Operative Ambivalence
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Table 1 
Effect of Response-Order on Meta-Ambivalence 
    
 
Forward 
(beginning with  
“Extremely conflicting”) 
Reversed 
(beginning with  
“Not conflicting at all”) Total 
Not conflicting at all 11.7% 13.9% 12.9% 
Slightly conflicting 19.3% 31.2% 25.3% 
Moderately conflicting 37.7% 35.9% 36.8% 
Very conflicting 22.0% 14.2% 18.1% 
Extremely conflicting 9.3% 4.7% 7.0% 
    
Number of cases 332 337 669 
    
    
Tau b  -0.143   
significance 0.000   
 
Table 2 
Effect of Response-Order on Favorable and Unfavorable Thoughts 
 Favorable thoughts  Unfavorable thoughts 
 Forward Reversed Total  Forward Reversed Total 
None 45.1% 47.9% 46.5%  32.9% 33.7% 33.3%
Slightly 6.8% 11.5% 9.2%  9.1% 12.0% 10.6%
Moderately 36.4% 32.1% 34.3%  22.6% 24.1% 23.3%
Very 11.1% 7.3% 9.2%  17.1% 18.7% 17.9%
Extremely 0.6% 1.2% 0.9%  18.3% 11.4% 14.8%
        
Number of cases 162 165 327  164 165 329
        
Tau b  -0.054    -0.049   
significance  0.295    0.329   
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Table 3 
Distribution of Respondents in Response-order and Question order conditions 
 Response Order 
Question Order Forward Reverse Total 
Meta first, then operative favorable/unfavorable 96 61 157 
Operative likes/dislikes first, then meta 77 103 180 
Operative favorable/unfavorable first, then meta 81 100 181 
Meta first, then operative likes/dislikes 89 68 157 
Total 343 332 675 
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Table 4 
Effects of Response Order and Question Order on Ambivalence measures 
          
 Meta-ambivalence   Operative (fav/unfav)  Operative (likes/dislikes) 
Forward Reverse  Forward Reverse  Forward Reverse  
Question Order          
Op (fav/unfav) first, then meta 2.95 2.25 0.18 -0.17 NA NA  
Op (likes/dislikes) first, then meta 2.80 2.63 NA NA -0.17 -0.03  
Meta first, then op (fav/unfav) 2.97 2.94 0.16 0.17 NA NA  
Meta first, then op (likes/dislikes) 3.19 2.97 NA NA -0.02 -0.04  
            
Entries are mean ambivalence scores for each question-order and response-order category. 
            
F-test F df sig F df sig F df sig 
Question-order effects 6.87 3 0.000 1.19 1 0.276 0.58 1 0.445
Response-order effects 11.17 1 0.001 1.29 1 0.257 0.40 1 0.527
Interaction 2.92 3 0.033 1.52 1 0.218 0.56 1 0.417
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Table 5 
Taub correlations between 2004 Trust DC to do what is right and 2006 Pilot Measures of Trust 
      Meta-ambivalence 
  All Respondents  Low Medium High 
Trust DC to do what is right  0.304   0.352 0.240 0.142 
   (212)   (85) (68) (59) 
         
Trust DC best and fair 
summed   0.364   0.466 0.306 0.306 
 - (category resp.)  (228)   (81) (96) (49) 
         
Trust DC best and fair 
summed  0.464   0.397 0.436 0.508 
 - (percent resp.)  (204)   (79) (68) (55) 
         
  Operative (fav/unfav)  Operative (likes/dislikes) 
   < 0 ≥ 0   < 0 ≥ 0 
Trust DC to do what is right  0.320 0.384   0.220 0.237 
  (37) (68)   (37) (69) 
         
Trust DC best and fair 
summed   0.342 0.280   0.380 0.412 
 - (category resp.)  (35) (67)   (59) (66) 
         
Trust DC best and fair 
summed  0.616 0.196   0.446 0.567 
 - (percent resp.)  (50) (58)   (36) (60) 
         
Entries are taub coefficients between Trust DC (2004 post) and 2006 pilot measure by level of 
ambivalence  
Number of cases are in parentheses 
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Table 6 
Logit Model Estimates of Hypothetical Vote Choice (Bush = 1, Clinton = 0) 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coeff. s.e. sig.  Coeff. s.e. sig. 
Text Order: Bush first -0.869 0.384 0.023  -0.865 0.394 0.028
Party ID 2004 0.850 0.112 0.000  0.859 0.114 0.000
Trust DC 2006 0.781 0.396 0.048  -0.528 1.085 0.627
Meta-ambivalence     -1.314 0.970 0.176
Meta-ambivalence by Trust DC 2006     0.523 0.425 0.218
Constant -4.515 1.041 0.000  -1.166 2.592 0.653
        
Number of Cases 208    208   
-2 log likelihood 177.420    175.284   
Nagelkerke R2 0.542    0.550   
        
 Model 3  Model 4 
 Coeff. s.e. sig.  Coeff. s.e. sig. 
Text Order: Bush first -0.436 0.583 0.455  -1.100 0.605 0.069
Party ID 2004 0.983 0.188 0.000  1.005 0.205 0.000
Trust DC 2006 1.180 0.666 0.076  -1.438 0.921 0.118
Operative ambivalence (fav/unfav) -0.667 1.302 0.609     
Operative ambivalence (likes/dislikes)     -10.267 3.968 0.010
Op Ambiv by Trust DC 2006 0.463 0.589 0.431  5.071 1.911 0.008
Constant -6.646 1.936 0.001  -0.062 1.939 0.974
        
Number of Cases 105    102   
-2 log likelihood 76.104    73.815   
Nagelkerke R2 0.621    0.646   
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Table 7 
Correlations between Measures of Interest and Ambivalence 
 
Operative 
fav/unfav 
Operative 
likes/dislikes Meta-ambivalence 
Interest in information -0.014 0.127 0.202 
- 2006 pilot (175) (168) (340) 
    
How closely pay attention -0.057 0.114 0.181 
- 2006 pilot (176) (168) (341) 
    
How often pay attention -0.070 -0.027 0.078 
- 2006 pilot (176) (168) (341) 
    
Attention to campaigns -0.102 0.089 0.167 
- 2006 pilot (156) (175) (333) 
    
Follow govt and public affairs -0.044 0.158 0.218 
- 2006 pilot (156) (175) (333) 
    
Interest in following campaigns -0.035 0.092 0.132 
- 2004 Pre (332) (343) (674) 
    
Interested in political campaigns 0.001 0.139 0.172 
- 2004 Post (315) (329) (643) 
    
Did R vote in 2004? -0.033 0.102 0.108 
- 2004 Post (315) (329) (643) 
    
Entries are taub coefficients (Bold indicates p < .05)   
Numbers of cases are in parentheses.   
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Table 8 
Correlations between Partisan/Ideological Strength,  
Preference for Divided Government, and Ambivalence 
 
Operative 
fav/unfav 
Operative 
likes/dislikes Meta-ambivalence 
Party id Strength (Gen Speaking) -0.030 0.003 0.129 
 - 2006 Pilot (154) (171) (324) 
    
Party id Strength (As of today) -0.005 0.075 -0.022 
 - 2006 Pilot (175) (168) (343) 
    
Party id Strength (Gen Speaking) -0.015 0.100 0.066 
 - 2004 Pre (327) (340) (666) 
    
Ideological Strength 0.029 0.120 -0.039 
 - 2004 Post (252) (284) (536) 
    
Preference for Divided Govt -0.052 -0.044 0.061 
- 2004 Pre (325) (332) (655) 
    
Entries are taub coefficients (Bold indicates p < .05) 
Numbers of cases are in parentheses. 
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